Different from either of these is the class of symbols used in expressing ideas. This class includes not only the words of written and spoken language, but also the natural signs of gesture language and the conventional signs of manual language taught to deaf mutes. The language is full of faded metaphors indicating the office of common words. They are said to express meaning, to convey thought, to embody ideas, to enshrine content. They may be likened to window-panes through which one sees what is back of them. Sometimes the window-panes, like spectacles when first worn, attract more attention from the person looking than the objects seen through them,—a parallel to what occurs when the articulate speech, or its rhetorical adornment, attracts more attention than the thought expressed. But if that which is seen through the window-pane is on the order of a Santa Claus loaded with toys and Christmas-gifts, then no notice is taken of the medium through which the object is seen. Hence the very best teaching—that which rivets attention upon the thought conveyed—always fails to teach the spelling of words incidentally. Furthermore, the instruction which frequently stops to draw attention to the grammar of the sentences, the spelling of the words or their mode of utterance, interferes with the formation of logical habits of thinking and divests the words of their function as expressive signs. When the word itself becomes an object of thought the mind is not thinking by means of that word. It has been well said that we may fail to apprehend the meaning of what a person is saying because the tone of his voice arrests our attention through its resemblance to that of some one else in whom we feel an interest; that so far as signs thus attract notice on their own account, they fail to fulfil their function as a means of attending to something other than themselves. For this very pertinent observation credit is due to Mr. G. F. Stout, who (“Mind,” lxii. page 18) has very clearly drawn the distinction between the three classes of signs or symbols used as helps in thinking. He says,—

“Suggestive signs serve only to bring something to mind; they are not a means of minding it when once recalled. An expressive sign, on the contrary, is a means of attending to its signification…​. Expressive signs differ from substitutes in a manner exactly the inverse of that in which they differ from suggestive signs. A suggestive sign has fulfilled its purpose and becomes of no further avail so soon as it has suggested its meaning. A substitute sign is a counter which takes the place of its meaning; so long as it fulfils its representative function it renders useless all reference to that which it represents. The counters are manipulated according to certain rules of operation until a certain result is reached, which is then interpreted. The operator may be actually unable to interpret the intermediate steps. Algebraical and arithmetical symbols are to a great extent used as mere substitute signs. The same is true of the symbols employed in formal logic. It is possible to use signs of this kind whenever fixed and definite rules of operation can be derived from the nature of the things symbolized, so as to be applied in manipulating the signs without further reference to their signification. A word is an instrument for thinking about the meaning which it expresses; a substitute sign is a means of not thinking about the meaning which it symbolizes.”

In addition to these three purposes the technical term may serve still another important end. It helps to fix the new concept or notion after it has been developed by skilful instruction. Its association therewith makes it a suggestive sign whenever occasion requires the recurrence of the concept or thought for which it stands. The train of thought is facilitated and made possible by the use of technical terms as expressive signs. And if the idea denoted by it can be accurately defined, so that the definition becomes a triumph of intellect, or if it can be quantified, so as to become a unit of measure like the volts, ohms, ampères, and watts in applied electricity, the technical term may even serve a purpose analogous to the substitute signs in sciences like formal logic and mathematics.

The foregoing analysis indicates the proper method of teaching technical terms. First, the basal concept should be carefully developed and clearly presented; it should then be fixed in the mind by association with the corresponding technical term; finally, the union should be made permanent by frequently causing the two to appear together in the domain of thought, by treating them as welcome guests when they appear together in the citadel of mind. Divorce of one from the other should be as impossible as in the case of the two parties to a suitable marriage. On the fête days of science they should appear together, each suggesting the presence of the other, the technical term serving as a helpmeet to the idea, and as its representative when, in the charmed circle of scientific investigation, the presence of the idea is not absolutely required. Circumlocutions, like name-word for noun, quality-word for adjective, and relation-word for preposition, may be helpful in presenting the idea or in introducing the technical term; they may be tolerated, like a third party in the making of a match; but when the match has been made, and the wedding has been solemnized, they should drop out of sight as of no further use. The figure of speech could easily be pressed too far; for many objects known to science have a common as well as a technical designation. Each has its proper place in the realm of thought,—the common name in ordinary conversation, the technical term when scientific precision is required.

VII

THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE

It seems to me quite certain that we can and do think things without thinking of any sound or words. Language seems to me to be necessary to the progress of thought, but not at all necessary to the mere act of thinking. It is a product of thought: a vehicle for the communication of it, a channel for the conveyance of it, and an embodiment which is essential to its growth and continuity. But it seems to be altogether erroneous to represent it as an inseparable part of cogitation. Donkeys and dogs are without true thought, not because they are speechless, but they are speechless because they have no abstract ideas, and no true reasoning powers. In parrots the power of mere articulation exists sometimes in wonderful perfection. But parrots are not so clever as many other birds which have no such power.

Man’s vocal organs are correlated with his brain. Both are equally mysterious, because they are co-operative, and yet separable, parts of “one plan.”

ARGYLL.

That the language may be fitted for its purpose, not only should every word perfectly express its meaning, but there should be no important meaning without its word. Whatever we have occasion to think of often, and for scientific purposes, ought to have a name appropriated to it.

VII

THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE

In the development of intellectual life three contingencies are possible.

Without doubt, these possibilities in mental growth exist for wise and beneficent purposes.

The tendency to acquire words without the corresponding ideas is, in at least one direction, a source of gain rather than loss. The pert phrases, profane words, and other objectionable language which the child accidentally hears from the lips of older persons, and at times uses to the unspeakable annoyance of parents and teachers, would be an occasion for far more serious alarm if the meaning were fully understood. Were it a law of our mental life that the hearing and learning of a profane or obscene word necessarily carried with it a clear grasp of the meaning, the resulting harm to the inner life of the soul would be immeasurably greater, and the stain upon the character would be vastly more difficult to remove. The objectionable language may mirror the habits of thought and speech into which those in charge of the child have fallen, awaken in them a new sense of their responsibility, and cause them to be more careful of what they say; or it may prove an index to the kind of company into which the child is drifting, and thus serve as a danger-signal to parent and teacher. When the mind has not learned to think the thought expressed, a simple warning against the use of such ugly words generally suffices to eradicate them from the child’s vocabulary; and in such instances it is a blessing in disguise that the learning of the words was not accompanied by the acquisition of their meaning. The loss to the intellectual life is more than balanced by the gain in moral training.